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I would like to thank the discussants for some
very stimulating comments. Being only human, I am
naturally pleased when others produce evidence or
arguments in support of my contentions, but being a
scientist, I am also pleased when others produce evi-
dence or arguments against my proposals (although
I may have to take a deep breath first), since this
represents the scientific process in action.
I should first make one thing clear: I agree with
Professor Friedman that substantial advances have
been made in recent years. Indeed, in my paper I
remarked that “developments such as the bootstrap
and other resampling approaches . . . have led to sig-
nificant advances in classification and other statis-
tical models.” However, what I question is whether
the advances, when taken in the context of real prac-
tical problems, are as great as is often claimed—the
recognition of the limitations of the new methods to
which Professor Friedman refers.
Professor Friedman agrees with my three points
that the improvements of newer methods over older
ones are less than those of the older ones over still
older ones, that the evidence favoring the superior-
ity of new methods is often suspect and that the
new methods fail to tackle important problems. I
draw the conclusion from these points that progress
is not as great as is imagined. Professor Friedman
draws the conclusion that low lying fruit is eas-
ier to gather, that initial validation of new meth-
ods should be more rigorous and that much work
remains to be done. Perhaps, then, we are really
broadly in agreement—only perhaps I am describ-
ing a half empty glass (the new classification tools
are not as wonderful as they are claimed), while Pro-
fessor Friedman is describing a half full glass (some
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classification tools represent advances over the older
ones).
I admit that I did criticize error rate as a perfor-
mance measure and then used it in the examples.
Since most performance comparisons of classifiers
use error rate, this seemed justifiable, and I believe
that my conclusions will generalize to other perfor-
mance measures. For example, I agree that in some
two-class problems it is the rank order of the esti-
mated class 1 membership probabilities which mat-
ters and that modern methods may well be able to
estimate this more accurately than older methods.
However, surely my points about population drift,
class definition uncertainty and so on still apply and,
of course, my point that people often use one crite-
rion to fit a model and another to evaluate it applies
even more strongly.
In fact, this point about people using different cri-
teria manifests itself at a higher level when Professor
Friedman and I examine my Table 1. I see the pro-
portion of reduction of error rate achieved by the
best method which can be achieved by discriminant
analysis, whereas Professor Friedman sees the ratio
of the error rates. I see a large initial improvement so
that subsequent improvements are relatively small;
he sees a large reduction in the proportion remain-
ing. Back to the half full/half empty glasses again.
We are both right, of course, although perhaps the
different perspectives are valuable for different uses.
For example, I agree with Professor Friedman’s ex-
ample of the zip code classifier—and here the ratio
of error rates might be a sensible measure—but (I
would imagine) this is a problem in which the dis-
tributions are fairly static. In other problems, the
distributions will change rapidly and I can imagine
many contexts when I would not want to place too
much trust in a reduction of error rate by a factor
even as large as 10, if it corresponded to a change
from a starting point as small as 0.001 to an even
smaller one of 0.0001. A slight shift in the shapes
of the distributions might induce sufficiently large
changes in error rate so as to make this change ir-
relevant.
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My regression example in Section 2.1 was merely
intended as an additional illustration of the fact that
the sequential nature of modeling means that typi-
cally later improvements are smaller than early ones.
I am suggesting that the first, relatively crude, mod-
els will generally yield greater marginal improve-
ments in predictive power than the later models.
This is the low hanging fruit phenomenon—athough,
as noted below and as Professor Stine illustrates,
there are exceptions.
I am glad Professor Friedman agrees so strongly
with Section 5 of the paper, on the difficulties of
obtaining generally valid empirical comparisons. I
think this is one of the most important parts of
the paper. Professor Friedman’s suggestion that the
top performers in comparison studies should be ig-
nored and attention should be focussed on the rel-
ative rankings of the others is very valuable. I also
recommend looking at those methods which gener-
ally perform well, even if they seldom perform best,
since they will have some sort of robustness. I think
these sorts of issues, which represent aspects of the
art of statistics, are fundamental to good statistical
practice. They are the sorts of things which are not
taught in standard statistics texts.
Professor Friedman comments that certain meth-
ods (he uses ensemble methods and support vec-
tor machines as examples) “offer substantial advan-
tages over the earlier methods in enough situations
to be regarded as major advances.” I agree that such
methods do represent significant theoretical and prac-
tical advances. My point is the milder one that “the
practical impact of the developments has been in-
flated; that although progress has been made, it may
well not be as great as has been suggested.” Again
referring to population drift as an example, a better
fit to data drawn from a given distribution is not so
wonderful if the distribution has changed. In fact,
of course, it is likely that Professor Friedman and I
have slightly different experience in terms of appli-
cation domains. He cites “scientific and engineering
applications” and I cite examples such as credit scor-
ing and fraud detection: he draws attention to the
differences between domains toward the end of his
contribution; it is possible that population drift is
more apparent in the latter than the former.
I entirely endorse Professor Friedman’s comment
that “obtaining high quality representative training
data is generally more important to success than
choice of a particular classifier.” We are agreed on
this, but in part my paper aims to point out that ob-
taining “representative training data” may be harder
than is often imagined. Incidentally, I often go one
step further and suggest that the best way to dra-
matically improve classifier performance is to add
suitably chosen extra discriminating variables—that
this is likely to exceed the performance improvement
attained by juggling with classification rules, but, of
course, this does depend on the specifics of the ap-
plication.
Professor Friedman points out that almost all mod-
ern procedures incorporate a regularization param-
eter that controls the goodness of fit to the training
data, and that one way to overcome problems such
as population drift or uncertainty in the class defi-
nitions is to regularize more heavily than one would
if such problems were not suspected. I agree, and I
also agree that there is no reason to suppose that the
arbitrary amount of extra regularization implied by
simpler older methods is the right amount. Indeed,
of course one can always find examples where it is
not, such as the large d small n cases of bioinfor-
matics. However, if one is unable to get a handle on
the amount of regularization which is needed, then
there is no reason to suppose that the more heavily
regularized modern method will be any better than
the implicitly regularized older method.
Professor Friedman provides a useful discussion
of tools for handling errors in class labels. These are
fine if one suspects that one has such errors. How-
ever, I was concerned with the question of robust-
ness to such errors if one is using a more standard
method, unaware of the possibility.
I am sorry to have disappointed Professor Stine by
not giving “a rich portfolio of examples that demon-
strate the failures of complex models.” To some ex-
tent I am caught in a Catch-22 situation here. For
example, had I demonstrated the superiority of a
simple linear classifier over a complex support vector
machine in a real example involving dramatic pop-
ulation drift, then an obvious response would have
been to build a more elaborate dynamic classifier or
apply a modern model with heavier than standard
regularization, as suggested by Professor Friedman.
For this particular situation, the “even more elabo-
rate model” would then win—and this will always be
the case for any particular example. However, across
examples, when one does not have specific reasons
to expect such departures from the classic “fixed un-
derlying distributions, precise class definitions” and
so on of the standard problem, then one will not use
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a tool specially matched to the problem, so there is
a risk that one will miss important features of the
problem. Perhaps all I am really saying is that ev-
ery problem has unique features, and that ideally
one would carefully model and allow for those fea-
tures, but if one is unaware of them (implicit in the
use of standard tools), then simple is better.
My reason for using the idealized example of equally
correlated predictors in Section 2.1 was merely to
make the mathematics particularly transparent. In-
deed, I pointed out that in real applications, the
phenomenon I demonstrated was likely to be even
more pronounced. However, I take Professor Stine’s
point that artificial examples can be used to sup-
port any argument (the intertwined spirals example
being a case in point!), but, in spite of the ingenuity
of his superadditive growth example, I believe that
empirical evidence shows that decreasing marginal
improvement as extra terms are added to a model
is the norm.
I am not arguing that there are no contexts in
which a small improvement in performance is valu-
able. Professor Stine’s example of data compression
is a nice one. Another, of course, would be a small
improvement in classification accuracy in a medi-
cal screening context—correctly diagnosing people
in time to be treated, for example. My argument
relates this apparent small improvement to other
sources of uncertainty in the problem. If the distri-
butions of characteristics of people with the disease
differ from the distributions used to construct the
classification rule, then the apparent improvement
may be illusory. Statistical significance does not af-
fect this argument. If the distributions are not the
right ones, it does not matter how statistically sig-
nificant the apparent improvements are.
Like Professor Friedman, Professor Stine takes me
to task for criticizing the use of inappropriate per-
formance criteria (which we agree is wrong) but then
using error rates in my example in Table 1. I agree,
of course, and in an ideal world I would have used
performance criteria better matched to the particu-
lar problems and objectives. To do this I would have
had to use my own examples, for which I knew the
relevant performance criteria, and then compared
linear discriminant analysis with the best perfor-
mance I could achieve using neural networks, sup-
port vector machines, random forests and the whole
panoply of other methods. However, if I then tried to
argue, as I did in the paper, that these sophisticated
tools were not that much better than linear discrim-
inant analysis, I would immediately be vulnerable to
the criticism that this was simply because I was not
very adept at using the other methods. I thought
it would be more compelling to use the results of
other, expert, analysts. This meant I was forced to
use error rate in my comparisons, simply because
this is the most widely used criterion.
Professor Stine’s comment about the difficulty of
extracting the full story from commercial clients, so
that one is confident that one is answering the right
question, struck a chord. Even worse, all too often
the client is incapable of formulating a precise ques-
tion. This is not intended as a criticism: often the
intrinsic uncertainties of the world (especially the
commercial world) make precise formulation impos-
sible. This, of course, was one of the issues which
stimulated my writing of the paper.
Professor Stine’s example of population drift in a
personnel selection problem is very nice. It involves
the key issue of drift due to natural background
changes (the economy), but also, presumably, the
employees on which the model was built were not
a random selection from previous applicants, but
had been chosen because someone thought they were
likely to be successful employees. This means, of
course, that the classifier would have been modeling
inappropriate distributions, unless some effort was
made to represent this prior selection process. This
is the same problem as that in the example of drivers
of white cars which Professor Stine cites, although
to a less extreme extent. I suspect that Professor
Stine is right when he doubts that any model would
have been very successful on this problem. Person-
nel selection problems are notoriously difficult. My
point is merely that there are aspects of this prob-
lem which are not considered in the classical super-
vised classification paradigm, which consists of try-
ing to model underlying distributions from a sample
of data drawn from those distributions.
Toward the end of his contribution, Professor Stine
asks for my suggestions on how to decide whether
it is useful to look for extra structure. I think one
should always look for this, but there are different
kinds of structure. There is the structure represented
by shape of the distribution from which the design
data were drawn, and there is structure in the over-
all problem (e.g., population drift). I am suggesting
that we are now pretty good at modeling the for-
mer, but that often the extra features of the dis-
tributions that our clever modern methods pick up
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are relatively unimportant compared with the po-
tential impact of taking into account the latter kind
of structure. So my answer to Professor Stine’s ques-
tion about my approach to deciding when additions
to a simple model are worthwhile is that I think it
is a matter of priorities. It is one thing to be able to
add another hidden node to a neural network and
hence reduce the misclassification rate (on those dis-
tributions) by 0.5%. It is another (and often a more
useful) thing to be able to say that one is really in-
terested in cost weighted error rate and is uncertain
about the costs, so that the Gini coefficient is a more
appropriate measure of performance, or that one be-
lieves the design data do not properly represent the
distributions of new cases and so on.
As far as population drift is concerned, I think
Professor Stine’s final paragraph hits the nail on the
head: statisticians now have a powerful armory of
methods to tackle this, but how often does one see
them integrated into the design of a classification
rule?
It is in this vein that Professor Holte rightly points
out that there are methods for dealing with some of
the factors that I identify as being unknown at the
time of classifier design or subject to change after
that time. In fact, I would be surprised if methods
do not exist for all such factors: the Kalman filters
Professor Stine refers to for population drift, Heck-
man models for sample selectivity, the cost curves of
Professor Holte and the weighted Gini coefficients of
Adams and Hand for unknown relative misclassifi-
cation costs, for example. In addition, if tools for
coping with a particular kind of uncertainty in the
problem indeed do not exist, then it is, as Professor
Holte says, a challenge for future research. Even if
such tools exist, how often are they applied? Once
again I wonder if, perhaps, it is just that it is eas-
ier to refine an existing form of classification model
(the extra nodes of the neural network, the more
sophisticated metric in nearest neighbor methods,
. . . ) than to model the sample distortion or adopt
a more complicated performance criterion. Perhaps
many of us academic researchers are still guilty of
focusing too much on Tukey’s exact answer to the
wrong problem. I hope I may be forgiven for mak-
ing that comment, since I, too, am an academic re-
searcher and I, too, know the pleasure of developing
a classification tool which appears to have a slight
edge over its competitors.
Professor Gayler’s comments were interesting, not
least because they were from precisely the perspec-
tive which had stimulated many of my observations—
the “nonclassical” problems which arise when applying
supervised classifiers in the context of modeling hu-
man behavior, specifically credit scoring.
Professor Gayler points out the great financial
gains which would result from a small increase in
predictive accuracy in this application domain, so
that one might have expected a premium to be placed
on such performance, making the fact that relatively
simple old-fashioned approaches are still used rather
surprising. He also points out that the new methods
are regularly investigated by the credit scoring com-
munity, but rarely make the transition to everyday
practice, suggesting that the simpler older methods
have some kind of advantage. Professor Gayler and
I agree that this advantage arises from the kinds of
issues described in my paper.
Professor Gayler mentions yet other kinds of com-
plications. For example, he refers to account man-
agement changes (which will occur after the accept/
reject classification has been made). This is a spe-
cial case of a more general class of problem. Often
we want to predict into what class an object (often
a person) will fall if we take some action. However, if
our prediction suggests that they will fall into some
undesirable class, then we take some other action.
This, of course, invalidates the prediction. It is a
generalization of the reject inference problem and
leads to particular sample selectivity issues.
Professor Gayler is right to point out that in many
problems the value of the threshold (to be com-
pared with the estimated probability of belonging
to class 1, e.g.) above which objects are assigned to
class 1 depends on operational decisions, and these
will be determined by all sorts of external factors.
I was particularly struck by Professor Gayler’s ob-
servation that “in the limit (and the hands of a
skilled modeler), every modeling technique should
end up in agreement because they are all approxi-
mating the same data.” I am reminded of Hoadley’s
ping-pong theorem, which presumably represents al-
ternate steps toward this limit! I was also taken by
his suggestion that it might be more useful “to look
at the effort required of the modeler to achieve a
given goodness of fit and other properties of the
models that are of operational relevance to the lender.”
I endorse this. Of what good (at least in the credit
scoring context) is a tool so highly sophisticated that
it can be used effectively only after years of practice
and experience? Operational relevance is a key fac-
tor.
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In fact, my comment about “intertwined spirals
or checkerboard patterns” refers to more than prob-
lems which can be modeled only as interactions be-
tween the variables. I meant it also to refer to those
problems which have an extremely complicated (or
perhaps contrived) decision surface. Such problems
appear to be extremely rare in the real world, so
demonstration of the power of new methods by show-
ing that they can tackle such problems is rarely rel-
evant to real problems. I conjecture that such prob-
lems are rare because in real problems the predic-
tor variables will generally have been chosen because
they are thought to have some discriminatory power,
and predicting that the classes would be separated
in such a complex way by a combination of vari-
ables would be an extraordinary intellectual feat.
It is much easier to identify variables on which the
members of one class have a tendency toward higher
values than the members of the other class.
I like Professor Gayler’s observation that it would
be undesirable (in a credit scoring context) for a
small change in decisions made when modeling to
lead to a large change in the models. This is true and
is a nice example of the pressures that favor simple
modeling strategies. In such an environment, the or-
ganizations need to be confident of their modeling
strategy and that it will be reliable in the hands of
other, perhaps less experienced staff. This is a phe-
nomenon similar to, but at a level different from, the
flat maximum effect. There the users of the models
want to be confident that slight changes in the model
(and indeed, the modeling conditions) will not lead
to sudden dramatic deterioration in performance: as
Gayler says, the flat maximum effect is a great ad-
vantage in credit scoring.
I still have a suspicion that there is too much em-
phasis on trying to squeeze the last drops of perfor-
mance out of classifiers matched to a particular data
set when these distributions might not be the right
ones, when the performance criterion being used is
inappropriate, when the class definitions might be
incorrect or subject to change and so on, with all
the mismatches illustrated in the paper and oth-
ers. Instead, I believe that more effort should be
spent on trying to identify and model aspects of the
problem which deviate from the classical supervised
classification paradigm, and which may have a sub-
stantial impact on performance. For example, if you
suspect the populations will change (perhaps not
in Professor Friedman’s scientific and engineering
problems, but certainly in the personnel and social
applications of Professor Stine, Professor Gayler and
myself ), then either model this or regularize more
heavily to allow for it; if you suspect that the sample
has not been randomly drawn but has been purpo-
sively selected (as in Professor Stine’s employee se-
lection example), use a model which adjusts for the
hypothesized selectivity or more heavily regularize
to avoid overfitting a suspected inaccurate distribu-
tion; if you know you are concerned with maximiz-
ing profit, then use profit as a performance criterion,
and not misclassification rate or likelihood, or else
regularize more heavily to allow for the fact that
there is a mismatch between the criterion being used
and the one of real interest; and so on.
I am extremely grateful to the discussants for their
thoughtful comments on the paper. It is apparent
that they spent a considerable amount of time and
effort carefully considering my points, and marshalling
coherent and instructive responses. Their comments
covered a wide range of issues and approached things
from different perspectives. It is very clear that,
whatever the merits of the paper itself, the discus-
sion contributions have substantial intrinsic value,
and I have certainly learnt a great deal from them.
